

# From Kant to Goethe

## Georg Simmel on the way to *Leben*<sup>1</sup>

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**K**ANT AND Goethe. They are, in this order, the most often quoted names in Simmel's work. They are its towering pillars and the arc between them describes his intellectual journey. On it, he follows a path that winds through the intellectual discipline of Kant's philosophy to the challenging debates within neo-Kantianism until it reaches a bifurcation that sees Simmel taking the route towards Goethe. The closer he moves towards Goethe, the larger Goethe's stature grows, and Simmel's with it. It is his immersion in the thought and life of Goethe that gathers in depth during the second half of his intellectual life, roughly speaking from the turn of the century to his death in 1918. If we wish to retrace this journey, we can use as our guide and yardstick the core concept of *Leben* ('Life'). It is employed by Simmel to unlock the conduct and philosophy of Goethe's life and of his own work and to investigate the intermeshing of the two. *Leben* also serves as the touchstone for his diagnosis of modernity and its discontents, and launches him into the midst of the evolving *Lebensphilosophie* approach. Notwithstanding interpretations of his work that note epistemological breaks and turns, an element of continuity in Simmel's work is certainly also evident in his sustained effort to capture *Leben* in its continuous flow and endless manifestations. The middle period of his work then comes to centre on the reciprocal effects of *Leben* and the cultural forms that strive to contain it.

The ambivalence implied here articulates Simmel the *Lebensphilosoph* with the 'sociologist of Modernity'. Life finds itself captured in the forms that make it culturally available. These, and the rationality that infuses them, assume a dominance in modernity that threatens to stifle and to 'turn life into a technical problem' ('Schopenhauer und Nietzsche', in Simmel, 1995b: 176). In his own philosophical struggle to come to terms with the fate of *Leben* under the conditions of modernity, Simmel recurs time and

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■ *Theory, Culture & Society* 2007 (SAGE, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore), Vol. 24(6): 139–158  
DOI: 10.1177/0263276407078716

again to Goethe as the truly integrated individual. Goethe provides an object of study and a signpost, an exemplar of a life in which *Leben* has come to its fullest expression.<sup>2</sup> Even the structure of the argument in ‘Kant und Goethe’ (Simmel, 1995a) owes much to Simmel’s interpretation of *Leben* as it manifested in Goethe, as a ‘lived polarity’, ‘the appearance of dualism and even pluralism within a decisive unity’ (‘Polarität und Gleichgewicht bei Goethe’, in Simmel, 2000: 2).

‘Kant und Goethe’ (Simmel, 1995a) helps us to trace the development and core ideas of his *Lebensphilosophie* from an early stage. Mirroring one against the other, Simmel brings to light the underlying stratum that both unites and differentiates them. In no other subsequent publication does *Leben* come to be addressed so directly in order to give contours to the emergent modern *Weltanschauung*.

### ***Leben* and the modern *Weltanschauung***

On first encountering ‘Kant und Goethe’ (Simmel, 1995a), the reader may be slightly perplexed by one aspect: the tenor of the essay is a counter-positioning of Goethe with Kant in order to highlight differences rather than commonalities. The subtitle ‘On the history of the modern *Weltanschauung*’ then refers to *Weltanschauung* in the singular. If we are presented with two contrasting and competing, if not incommensurable, world-views represented by the philosophies of Kant and Goethe, then why does Simmel suggest he is providing a history of *the* modern *Weltanschauung*? One may also ponder why this subtitle appeared as late as the third edition<sup>3</sup> of the essay.

When Simmel published an earlier, shorter version of ‘Kant und Goethe’ in 1899, he entered a debate that had been developing in the second half of the 19th century. Rather than state the issues that had arisen with the demise of the predominance of Hegelian philosophy, let it suffice here to note the two slogans that signposted proffered solutions: ‘Back to Kant’, followed soon after by ‘Back to Goethe’. At that time still associated with the southwest-German school of neo-Kantianism<sup>4</sup> led by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, it marks Simmel’s first significant publication on Goethe. There then followed a steady stream of writings on Goethe’s life and work. Only a few years after the publication of ‘Kant und Goethe’ in 1904, a collection of essays published by Simmel as a monograph entitled ‘Goethe’ joined an impressive array of books under the same title being published around that time. Its content evidences how far Simmel had by then moved along his path from neo-Kantianism towards *Lebensphilosophie*. It is a journey that found its culmination in the work completed shortly before his death, the profound and richly metaphysical *Lebensanschauung*.

The discursive strategy employed in Simmel’s essay is one that pits Goethe against Kant. The reader is presented with two sets of ontological and epistemological presuppositions, existential orientations and modes of conduct, which are in due course evidenced not only as opposing but as

mutually exclusive. Until the closing section opens up a new vista that adumbrates a resolution, the subtitle merely adds to the conundrum. As we become aware that Kant and Goethe also serve as figureheads for fundamental, almost tectonic, positions underlying the central intellectual, cultural and political commitments of Simmel's epoch, the issue becomes more pressing. Can these opposites ever be reconciled? Can mechanistic and organicist conceptions of the universe and our place within it find a common ground? Can a cultural code based on exacting moral-aesthetic values be sustained within a materialistic-scientific civilization?

Simmel draws a Goethean veil over the dramatic choices he has placed in front of the reader. That is, he steps back from providing an unambiguous, cut-and-dried answer that might relieve us of our anxieties, and instead points to the future for a possible reconciliation, and to *Leben* as the ground where these opposites could be recognized as constitutive elements.<sup>5</sup> Even so, such reconciliation would, upon a close reading of the essay, amount to an accommodation of the Kantian moment to a Goethean position. Goethe's life and work already represents a totality, an integrated wholeness that could serve as a resource when the time is ripe for it. For Simmel this is now, and '[n]ow it appears that in the twentieth century mechanistic movement had to pass its position as the ultimate foundation to another concept, that of *Leben*' (*Henri Bergson*, in Simmel, 2000: 2). It is thus *Leben*, in Simmel's view, which forms the gist of the 'modern Weltanschauung'. To locate the significance of it, Simmel accords it the same centrality as other core concepts that can be drawn on to characterize previous epochs. Greek philosophy and the Hellenic epoch revolved around the pivotal concept of 'substance'. Late Renaissance then saw the rise of a mechanistic conception of the universe in tandem with the rise of the natural sciences. It is as a consequence of, and antidote to, our epochal notion that *Leben* came to the fore in modern times. Simmel advances and deepens the argument further by seeing the former as being itself the product of *Leben* and as one of its self-manifestations: 'Mechanism, the opposite of *Leben* [that] itself derives from *Leben*' (p. 12). It is not possible to condense world-historical movements of thought and their inter-relationships any further. It is with almost Hegelian bravado that Simmel appears to suggest that only now, in the modern epoch, has *Leben* come into itself, achieved full self-consciousness and come to realize itself as the generating dynamic that is at work in bringing forth itself and its opposites, all in a ceaseless flow. In this, the vitalism of Bergson and its German counterpart are the contemporaneous, but parallel and largely unrelated, intellectual extrusions of *Leben* that try to comprehend the dynamic that had itself given rise to them and reverberates within them. Since it is the dynamic aspect of *Leben* that maintains existence in a state of creative flux, Simmel's neologism of *Verlebendigung* (enlivening, infusing with life) introduced in later writings is very apt and can stand as the programmatic term of *Lebensphilosophie*.

### Leben confronting Idealist philosophy: Goethe reading Kant

Every intellectual movement needs its villains as well as its heroes. *Lebensphilosophie*, particularly in its later stages and with its more vituperative spokesmen, established itself in direct opposition to the ‘machine age’, the mechanistic universe and the stultifying social and cultural existence it gave rise to in industrial society. In this attack, the figure of Newton always hovered in the background as a chief target. And who was a more appropriate counter-posing force to draw on than Goethe, whose vitriolic rejection of the ethos and practices of Newtonian science highlighted possible alternatives more clearly. Stylizing the battle between the two major orientations, the mechanistic and organic *Weltanschauung*, as one between personalities almost inevitably led to a confrontation between Goethe on the one side, and Newton’s most dedicated disciple in the field of philosophy on the other: Kant. Given so much was at stake, it is not surprising that protagonists in the debate employed vigorous arguments and language. Nietzsche, for example, thundered in his *Götzen-Dämmerung* from 1889:

He [Goethe] did not divorce himself from Leben, but placed himself fully within it; he was not faint-hearted and took as much as possible on himself, on top of himself, and within himself. What he was seeking was totality; he combated that splitting apart of reason, sensuality, feeling, will (perpetrated in a most horribly scholastic manner by Kant, the antipode of Goethe). (1969: 146)<sup>6</sup>

As far as the two protagonists themselves were concerned, there was little apparent trace of any antagonism between them. When the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1973), which set the cornerstone of his late but enduring prominence, was published in 1781, Kant was 57 years of age. By then, Goethe, 25 years his junior, had already enjoyed for seven years the authorial fame acquired as the fate of the Romantic hero in *The Sorrows of the Young Werther* had found a pan-European resonance. It is unlikely that Goethe’s admirers included the sober Kant. Goethe’s later scientific work on the theory of colour, which led to his trenchant critique of Newton’s science in general and his Optics in particular, would hardly have endeared him to Kant either. But in between, there would have been opportunity for Kant to express a view on Goethe’s scientific approach. His morphology of plants and animals and his methodological writings all contain direct and indirect links and references to Kant and they were widely discussed at the time.

While it appears that Kant did not acknowledge Goethe with a single reference in his philosophical work or his letters, the latter was more forthcoming with praise. Given his ingrained doubts about the value of philosophy as a separate enterprise divorced from activity, this was quite a noteworthy occurrence. Goethe, in his self-perception, was not philosophically inclined. Yet, someone ‘who thinks and reflects on the whole is a philosopher. Goethe is that in the highest degree’ (Jaspers, 1984 [1947]: 297).

He admits not to have possessed a receptive mind regarding philosophy, at least in the one prevailing at his time:<sup>7</sup> ‘I have no interest in getting to know more about Hegel’s philosophy, even though I like him as a person. All the philosophy I need I have enough of in store to last me my life-time; actually, I do not need any’ (Mandelkow, 1984 [1947]: 531, n. 10). When he did engage with it, it was for particular concerns associated with his ongoing work, and even then, at least in his own estimation, ‘quite superficially’. With the *Critique of Pure Reason*, ‘I was attracted into the foyer but did not wish to venture into the labyrinth; at times my poetic inclinations at others my common sense prevented me, and I never felt improved by it’ (‘Einwirkung der Neueren Philosophie’, in *Goethe’s Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe* 13: 27 [hereafter cited in the form HA 13: 27]). Looking back much later on the course of his methodological positions in the 1820s, he summarizes its cursory impact on him, derived not so much from his own study as from listening in on discussions about Kant within his circle of friends. Already the starting point of the *Critique* lies outside his way of thinking. Kant, in his view, examines the central question, one that defines modern philosophy: how much our mind, and how much external reality, contribute to knowledge. Goethe, however, considers the Cartesian problematic underlying the attempt to reconcile subject and object as misplaced, since he never separated the two in his own thinking in the first place. If pushed, Goethe will admit to preferring Kant’s solution to this core issue to that of other philosophers, not because he was necessarily fully convinced by the details of the argument advanced, but because it is the one ‘that gave the most honourable account of the human being’ (HA 13: 27). When he finds a certain cogency in the notions of a priori knowledge and synthetic judgements it is, again, not for directly philosophical reasons, but because they represent the unified duality that Goethe seeks and finds in all significant phenomena. ‘All my life I proceeded like this, whether in writing poetry or in observation; synthetically, and then analytically; the systole and diastole of the human mind was for me like a second taking of breath, never separated, always pulsating’ (HA 13: 27).

It was, characteristically, his scientific practice that drew him back to Kant. ‘I could not fail to notice that Nature follows always an analytical method, a development from a living, mysterious whole; and then it seems to act synthetically in that it brings together apparently unrelated conditions and connects them within some kind of unity’ (HA 13: 28). This account was written as late as 1817 while he was immersed in his morphological studies. It recounts the historical influence of Kant’s teaching on his work, culminating in ‘the most joyous period in my life’. This he derived after receiving a copy of the *Critique of Judgement*, ‘. . . where I found my most disparate activities placed side-by-side; artistic production and those of nature treated in the same way; aesthetic and teleological faculty of judgement illuminating each other’ (HA 13: 28). While he does not explicitly state so, it is very likely that it was Schiller who led Goethe to engage in some depth with Kant’s third *Critique*. For later readers, it has the benefit

of Goethe providing an exposition of his evolving methodological principles regarding the study of organic nature. It is here that we find significant pointers towards, and articulations of, the concept of *Leben*. Interestingly, it is this concern with *Leben* and Nature, or Nature as manifestation of *Leben*, which very nearly prevented one of the most productive friendships from forming. It is the one that came to create a cultural epoch and an underlying cultural project all its own: Weimar Classicism.

During Goethe's two-year stay in Italy, Schiller had been appointed Professor of History at the University of Jena. Upon his return to his position of Privy Councillor at the Ducal Court of nearby Weimar, Goethe had no inclination whatsoever to make his acquaintance. Not only did the quasi-revolutionist figure of Franz Moor in *Die Räuber* (The Robbers) repel him; in fact, Schiller's first play, raised 'all the ethical and theatrical paradoxes I had been trying to cleanse myself of' ('Glückliches Ereignis', HA 10: 538), stated a Goethe whose recent experience of classical antiquity had led him to shed the old skin of *Storm and Stress*. But compounding his dislike of Schiller was the latter's staunch Kantianism that had infused one of the most formative essays on aesthetics in the second half of the nineteenth century. 'Anmut und Würde' ('Grace and Dignity') exhibited a disregard for Nature which Goethe found deeply offensive. Schiller had 'expressed himself harshly against the good mother' ('Bedenken und Ergebung', HA 13: 29), Goethe remembers in 1817, 12 years after Schiller's death. Some years later, he again returns to this theme and observes:

He [Schiller] joyously absorbed Kantian philosophy which elevates the Subject to such an extent while appearing to constrain it. This engendered in him the exceptional gifts which nature had endowed him with. In an elevated feeling of freedom and self-determination, he was ungrateful against the Great Mother which really did not treat him all that badly. Instead of considering [Nature] as bringing herself forth in a living process, and in an ordered way from the highest to the lowest forms, he took her from the perspective of some empirical given, as a natural endowment of humanity. ('Glückliches Ereignis', HA 10: 539)

Yet, this strong reservation against Enlightenment rationality and philosophical Idealism and their denigration of Nature did not stop Goethe from continuing to engage in a fruitful study of Kant.

A short statement entitled 'Anschauende Urteilskraft', written in 1817, evidences Goethe's mastery and creative use of Kantian philosophy. While his interpretations frequently fail to convince orthodox followers of Kant, they helped him to clarify his own procedures and provided pointers for further study. The title itself is a challenging development of Kant in the direction of Goethe's own trajectory; it expands the argument of the *Critique of Judgement* to encompass his own mode of perception, *Anschauung*. This key term encapsulates Goethe's way of 'seeing' the object of study; a way of engaging with it that includes looking-at, gazing, contemplating, seeing-beyond, beholding, perceiving the core, intuitive apperception, establishing

an intuitive bond. It overcomes the subject–object division, on which modern natural science is predicated, through the subject’s full participation in the Oneness of Nature. In it, ‘Leben meets Leben’. It is an insight that Wilhelm Dilthey made subsequent epistemological use of in his foundation of the *Geisteswissenschaften* (1878). Akin to the universality of the hermeneutic problematic, this being-with constitutes the prerequisite for engaging with the object of study in both the human and natural sciences. It is this preceding and encompassing oneness that leads to Goethe’s succinctly programmatic comment: ‘is not the core of Nature already contained in the heart of Man?’ It is hard to find a statement that more powerfully encapsulates the difference between Goethean oneness and Kantian duality.

Goethe hardly ever quotes other authors, preferring to paraphrase and thus absorb new ideas into his own body of thought. Here, however, he quotes Kant at some length, from the *Critique of Judgement*:

We can think of an intellect (*Verstand*) which, because it is not discursive like our own but intuitive, can move from a synthetic general, the *Anschauung* of a whole as such, to the particular; that is, from the whole to its parts. It is hereby not necessary to prove that such an intellectus archetypus is possible. (‘Anschauende Urteilskraft’, HA 13: 30)

In Goethe’s reading, Kant here points to a divine intellect as the source and underlying force of the unified whole of existence. But it is one that remains, of course, inaccessible to the intellect. He then points out that in ethics, through a belief in God and immortality, we are already capable of elevating ourselves into the ‘highest region’ and come close to beholding ‘the primary Being’. In a daring and profound conclusion he consequently argues ‘that the same should apply in the intellectual field: through contemplatively beholding [*anschauen*] unceasingly creative Nature, we gain the privilege of spiritual participation in its creations’ (*Anschauende Urteilskraft*, HA 13: 31). One year later, these points are taken up again and given a clear and succinct formulation:

When we behold the world in its widest extension and final divisibility, we cannot avoid the conception that underlying the whole is an Idea, according to which God is creative and effective in Nature, as Nature is in God, from eternity to eternity. *Anschauung*, contemplation, reflection, lead us closer towards its secrets. We then venture to grasp Ideas, or more modestly formulate Concepts that could be analogous to those primordial beginnings. (*Bedenken und Ergebung*, HA 13: 32)

In essence, Goethe’s methodology, as sketched here, revolves around this core: a concrete, direct, contemplative knowledge of Nature (*anschauliches Naturwissen*). Towards this, he develops a series of terms: *Urphänomen*, metamorphosis, *Urtypus*, polarity, enhancement, etc. His analyses

[S]eek out, as accurately as possible, all the conditions in which phenomena appear and they aim for a completeness of the phenomena since they ultimately all fit together . . . and have to form a kind of organization before the researcher's *anschauen* that manifests their internal living wholeness [*Gesamtleben*]. ('Einwirkung der Neueren Philosophie', HA 13: 25)

Goethe stated, significantly, that he was not a *Naturforscher* (researcher) or *Naturphilosoph*, but a *Naturschauer*. His way of thinking and looking is a finding-oneself-within the phenomena through their beholding, a bringing-out of whatever the object is prepared to reveal, and finding a new significant word for it. While thus deriving philosophical validation for his own method and ideational constructs, there are further aspects of the *Critique of Judgement* that shed light on Goethe's procedures and assumptions regarding:

- (a) the relationship of aesthetic judgement and organic entities;
- (b) the relationship of causal and teleological explanation;
- (c) the conception of *Leben*, as meaning more than organic life and also including organized and formative process.

In the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant distinguishes between a 'determining judgement' – that is the faculty to subsume a particular under a general – and a 'reflective' one, in which the general encompassing a particular has to be arrived at. As the quality of relationships falling under the jurisdiction of judgements cannot be arrived at through the senses, it is again an a priori faculty located within our thinking, which is employed in judging how appropriately the general and the particular are related.

Here, a form of judgement that does not inquire into a cause–effect relationship between two events, but into their appropriateness (*Zweckmäßigkeit*), comes into play. That there should be a 'fit' between two objects requires a judgement that cannot be derived from any possible experience but, again, has to be a priori. The concept of 'appropriateness' allows us to integrate the manifold of experience into a unity, a general situated 'behind' them. The realm of Nature is thus represented in reflective judgement 'as if an Intelligence [*Verstand*] contained within itself the unity of the manifold of the empirical' (Kant, 1978: 331). From this statement, it may be understandable why Goethe should have derived such satisfaction and joy from the *Critique of Judgement*. First, his roots in Spinozan cosmology with its idea of a God-Nature, and the pantheism he confessed to espouse in the study of Nature, all point to a 'plan', an intelligence at the *Urgrund*. However, the Kantian Idea can ever only be a dim reflection of it.<sup>8</sup> Ultimately, it is this foundation that underlies Goethe's concept of *Leben* and the fundamental belief in the Oneness of the universe.

Simmel, however, suggests that Goethe's understanding of Spinoza,<sup>9</sup> perpetuated by interpreters ever since, may be in need of correction:



His All-and-Oneness, Nature as a whole, is a soul-imbued, pulsating, living development, not the . . . internally dead, absolute substance of Spinoza, which acquires its movement only from the mechanism of its parts. I am convinced that Goethe attributed Spinoza's conception of Nature with a livingness alien to it. He [Goethe] himself placed his pantheism in total opposition to non-living, mechanistic monism: 'the doctrine of All-in-One', he had stated, 'brings as much gain as it loses; and at the end, what is left is a consoling zero'. In the process of *Leben*, not in mechanism, did he find the unity of oneness and movement. ('Fragmente eines Goethe-Buches', in Simmel, 2000)<sup>10</sup>

Second, Goethe explicitly welcomed that the *Critique of Judgement* brought together beauty and nature: 'I was delighted that poetry and comparative nature study were so closely related and subjected themselves to the same faculty of judgement' ('Einwirkung der Neueren Philosophie', HA 13: 28). Not only are they intertwined in aesthetics – notably in the notion of the 'sublime' that Kant develops in reference to the sense of awe inspired by dramatic natural sights and events – as the *Critique of Judgement* falls into the two parts of a critique of the faculty of aesthetic judgement and a critique of the faculty of teleological judgement, their overarching integration is achieved, as already mentioned, through the concept of 'appropriateness'. In the case of aesthetics, it is a 'subjective' judgement in that 'appropriateness' is an 'internal' one, relating the form of an object to our cognitive capacity, and is indicated by a harmony between our faculty of imagination and of the Understanding. 'Objective' judgement of appropriateness does not offer a concept of the object but acts as a regulative principle, as an ordering device within the infinite plurality of appearances. Thus, 'we can view the beauty of nature as the representation of a concept of formal (that is merely subjective) appropriateness, and of purpose in nature [*Naturzwecke*] as the representation of a real (objective) appropriateness' (Kant, 1978: 334). While related through their a priori form and function, judgements concerning either the beauty or the purposes of natural phenomena diverge in the consideration as to whether the standards of judgement refer us to our sense of pleasure or to the faculties of Understanding and Reason. Third, we need to address the meaning of organic Nature and *Leben* in relation to Goethe's reading of Kant. It is not possible to depict Goethe's involvement with Nature more succinctly than by referring to the two kinds of judgements that can be made about it, that is, aesthetic and teleological ones. It is now necessary to examine the latter a little closer.

The critique of teleological judgement opens with an account of the 'objective appropriateness' in relation to natural phenomena. This notion, Kant argues, can be drawn on 'where mere causal explanation is no longer sufficient' (Kant, 1978: 336). However, whereas for him, causal explanations should be sought wherever possible, for Goethe, the position is reversed. He objects to causal explanations on at least two grounds: first, tracing effects to their cause merely establishes a historical connection; second, and

even more telling, causal explanations rely on external factors, on a necessity they are subjected to, which for Goethe is anathema since it destroys the integrity of the object.

Yet, when it comes to analysing reflective judgements, Goethe and Kant are in accord. An object, as a purpose within nature, is characterized by a part/whole relationship: its parts are only possible through a relationship with the whole and by reciprocal relationships with one another. This then constitutes an ‘organic’ – that is ‘organized’ – entity. It contrasts with mechanical organization; as in clockwork, the part/whole relationship in organic nature is also one that contains a binding force that cannot be accounted for in mechanistic terms. Concomitantly, organic wholeness, and the ‘idea of the whole which determines the form and connection of all its parts is not available in experience. It can be thought of only in analogy with human purposive action in which the whole, that is the idea of its purpose, precedes its parts. In relation to organisms, we then form our judgements regarding their appropriateness *as if* the idea of the whole formed the cause for the existence of its parts. It is a convenient, if necessary, fiction.

When Goethe enthusiastically agrees, he does so for reasons all his own, and not those at work in Kant. Here again he may have committed the self-confessed ‘failing’ of ‘interpreting Kant from his own position . . . because I only expressed what had been stirred up inside me, not what I had read’ (‘Einwirkung der Neueren Philosophie’, HA 13: 28). His interpretations had already aroused friendly controversy among professed Kantians in Goethe’s circle. Simmel gives possible reasons for their slight bemusement. Goethe reads Kant as if he was supporting his rejection of the idea of purpose in nature. In Goethe’s view, ‘Nature is too grand to be attributed purpose externally’. But Kant’s intention was the opposite of Goethe’s. For him, the fact that mechanistic relations and causal explanations are inappropriate for understanding phenomena of Life requires us to resort to a substitute, fictive account – that of anthropomorphic ‘purpose’. But this move in no way represents a refusal to apply the ‘scientific’ model to organic phenomena out of some kind of piety towards nature. In the Kantian scheme of things, *Leben* seems to represent something of a residual category, held in abeyance methodologically until science has advanced enough for causal mechanism to be applied. Here is Simmel’s account of this problematic:

From the same starting point regarding phenomena, in which the parts are determined by the whole and where mechanistic explanations are insufficient, their ways part. Kant, as it were, moves downwards and concludes that they therefore cannot be grasped objectively at all but are only accommodated intellectually by the subject and his reflexivity. Goethe, however, moves upwards, to something that lies beyond the living organism as a single branch within general existence, towards a unity of Nature as such. Its meaning takes an organic form, that is the penetration of the parts by the whole. In Kant, the organism is interpreted in reference to something lesser than itself; in Goethe through something more than itself. (‘Fragmente eines Goethe-Buches’, in Simmel, 2000: 12)

We may have here the most succinct formulation of the contrast between the *Weltanschauung* of Kant and Goethe regarding the phenomenon of *Leben* and the organic and organizational complexity that constitute it. Here already are the seeds that bear fruit in his *Lebensphilosophie*, and the opposition it establishes and highlights between Kant and Goethe. It would be instructive to explore this early link between Goethe and *Lebensphilosophie* just a little further.

It would appear at the outset that constructing Kant and Goethe as opposites is a little unhelpful here. While it may capture their differential trajectory, it fails to provide an accurate picture of the actual course of developments. Reading the *Critique of Judgement*, Goethe came across a reference to theories of epigenesis, and an author Kant was according praise. ‘Such testimony from the reliable Kant’, Goethe notes, ‘led me to consult the work of Blumenbach again . . . and that of Caspar Friedrich Wolff’ (‘Bildungstrieb’, HA 13: 32). The passage in question derives from a short piece written in 1818, entitled ‘Bildungstrieb’ (formative drive). In the space of two pages, Goethe adumbrates his conception of evolution, which, in large measure, succeeds in subordinating theories of evolution current at the time to his concept of ‘metamorphosis’. Wolff, ‘to support his epigenesis, had to presuppose an organic element that sustained entities designated to become organic life. This matter he called *vim essentialis*, something that assists anything that wants to bring itself forth, and which therefore elevated itself to the level of a productive element’ (‘Bildungstrieb’, HA 13: 32). This term, which seems to point ahead to the *élan vital*, did not fully satisfy Goethe, ‘lacking the substantive-material dimension adhering even to organic matter’. Conversely, the term *Kraft* (energy) which became significant in some of the formulations of *Lebensphilosophie*, was also rejected because it remains ‘too physicalist, even mechanistic’. Also, the entity that was to acquire organization remained obscure in this. It was the achievement of Blumenbach ‘who anthropomorphized the word which resolved that riddle, calling it a *nisus formativus*, a *Trieb* (drive), a vigorous activity that effects a formation’ (HA 13: 33).

This is the crucial point: Goethe’s formulations of the concept of *Leben* insist on the co-presence and inter-relation of substance and form, agency and structure, drive and formation, hence *Bildungstrieb*. Goethe again introduces a key term in an almost casual manner, leaving it to the reader to develop its implications. To delineate such an interpretation, one could note Gadamer’s revealing account of the conceptual history of *Bildung*. It has its origins with the mystics of the Middle Ages and the Baroque age, and then in Klopstock’s ‘Messias’, before it gained its determination in Herder as *Emporbildung zur Humanität* (developing upwards towards humanity). Gadamer (1975: 8) notes that this word ‘acquired its final meaning for us, as shaped by Herder, between Kant and Hegel’. He also refers to the earlier usage of *Bildung* as a ‘natural formation’, as in the formation of a body’s limbs, or a well-formed body, and more generally a shape generated by nature (e.g. the formation of a mountain range)

and notes that this meaning was later replaced by the one linking it with *Kultur*.

One is thus tempted to insert Goethe's name 'between Kant and Hegel'. In light of the homology, or 'analogy' as Goethe referred to it, between processes in nature and culture, and the stress on the obligation of every individual unceasingly to strive and develop, the coining of '*Bildungstrieb*' appears highly appropriate and felicitous.<sup>11</sup>

### **Simmel, Goethe and *Lebensphilosophie***

In Goethe's work, *Leben* represents a depth-ontological category, a primordial process, an *Ur-Leben*, so to speak, a foundational self-founding. It corresponds to 'an activity together with a substratum that we have to think of as co-existing perpetually. This immensity is personified in a God, as creative and maintaining, whom we are called upon to pray to, revere and praise in all manners possible' (HA 13: 33).

It may be possible to strengthen this line of argumentation by noting a possible parallel between it and Kant's schema of a critical philosophy. After all, *Stoff*, as sense-material, and the a priori 'forms' of Sensibility and Understanding together provide the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. Is it then not possible to suggest that Goethe applies this Kantian schema, 'merely' replacing the speculative Reason that contains this inventory with his concept of *Leben*? In a further step, if the 'substratum' in the above quote from his essay on '*Bildungstrieb*' is given a Spinozan interpretation, does it not then cover the 'substance' which in the latter's philosophy is largely coterminous with 'nature'? But whereas Spinoza already equates these terms with 'God',<sup>12</sup> Goethe seems to relate them to a 'sub-stare', to an entity underpinning of *Leben* that is 'personified in a God'.

At this stage, a number of points relevant to the concept of *Leben* as developed by Goethe in his reading of Kant can be drawn together, and some later trajectories towards vitalism and *Lebensphilosophie* outlined. For this, Simmel's writings on Goethe and *Leben* after his first account in 'Kant und Goethe' provide rich insights, too numerous to be introduced into the argument here. It may, instead, be possible to sketch a plausible construction of the effective history of Goethean *Leben* in terms of the rise of *Lebensphilosophie*. Before this, though, a quote from Goethe cited by Simmel encapsulates the gist of the above considerations, the relationship of *Leben* and *Bildung*, in a wonderfully concise way: 'For your life to acquire form, your thought to acquire life/let the enlivening power always be the forming one, too' ('Die Stetigkeit in Goethes Weltbild', in Simmel, 2000: 5).<sup>13</sup>

Simmel writes in a vein corresponding to Goethe of *Leben* as 'the metaphysical, foundational principle that generates subject and object from within itself' ('Über einige gegenwärtige Probleme der Philosophie', in Simmel, 2000: 6). In his last work, '*Lebensanschauung*', he arrives at the notion of an 'absolute *Leben*' as the metaphysical grounding of the unicity of the manifestations of *Leben*.<sup>14</sup> At this point, building upon *Leben*-as process, it serves to supersede the epoch based on the principle of

mechanism, in which Simmel includes the philosophy of Kant. As such, it sustains the rise of the *Philosophie des Lebens*. This philosophical approach, which even defines for him the new epoch, is, interestingly, contrasted a few pages earlier with the more current term of *Lebensphilosophie*. Marking out a certain distancing from the philosophy he is commonly associated with, he describes it as ‘in general, either merely moral preaching or a reflection upon certain typical elements of Leben’ (‘Über einige gegenwärtige Probleme der Philosophie’, in Simmel, 2000: 4). Clarifying the *Philosophie des Lebens* approach, to stay with this term for a moment longer, Simmel’s words echo Goethe’s when he writes, ‘The philosophy that recurs to the Lebensprozess as the highest generality and ultimate formative force [*Formungskraft*] of the being-in-the world [*Dasein*] allocated to us, seems to provide the most essential motif that the present can contribute to the historical development of the philosophical spirit’ (‘Über einige gegenwärtige Probleme der Philosophie’, in Simmel, 2000: 2). This philosophy articulates what Goethe had set as his own goal in the debate with Newtonian science and its mechanistic conception of the universe. Simmel talks of a *Verlebendigung*, an ‘infusing with life’, as the hallmark of that new epoch in philosophy: anti-mechanistic, post-Kantian.

Neo-Kantianism remained tied to the old canon and merely added to the barriers erected against a direct philosophical access to *Leben*, with its self-imposed straightjacket restricting it to transcendental inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. What had been a ‘critical’ impulse in Kant, trying to clear the decks before making strides into new territory, in the hands of neo-Kantians had become an obstacle, ‘especially in Germany, where one is permanently inhibited by the epistemological question: do we, in fact, have the right and the means to gain such knowledge (as in speculative thought, and when imaging the object directly)?’ (‘Über einige gegenwärtige Probleme der Philosophie’, in Simmel, 2000: 3). Venting more disdain on Kant and his epigoni than Goethe could ever have summoned up, Simmel continues to suggest that the reason for the ‘suggestive effect’ that the philosophies of both Husserl and Bergson had, lies precisely in their liberation from Kantian presuppositions – ‘the Kantian leg-irons’.

Where Goethe consistently tried to offer a conciliatory account, Simmel rejects unambiguously. Already in 1896, asking ‘What is Kant to Us?’, Simmel refers to Kant as the representative of an obsolete position, one that tries to offer a unitary account – a grand narrative. The ‘modern Weltanschauung’, in contrast, recognizes the ‘living flux of development’ and sees ‘the forms of cognition as subject to the stream of development’ (‘Was ist uns Kant’, in Simmel, 2000: 12). By 1908, Kant’s critical philosophy is described as ‘anthropomorphic’ and the result of a certain ‘megalomania’ as the intellect is enthroned as law-giver over and above ‘living activity’ (‘Über Goethes und Kants moralische Weltanschauung’, in Simmel, 2000: 3). Because *Leben* infuses all existence, human and non-human, the study of Nature can provide insights into the processes of human existence, and vice-versa.<sup>15</sup> It thus also suggests a unity between the cosmic and the personal

that had characterized Greek philosophy at its beginnings. Goethe still inhabits this tradition, which revolves around the organic wholeness of existence.

While aware that this may be an unfounded over-dramatization, it could be argued that from this point on we can detect a scaling-down of the initial ambition of a *Philosophie des Lebens*, and a bifurcation in its trajectory. Schopenhauer, whom Simmel considers the first *Lebensphilosophie*,<sup>16</sup> still adheres to such a fully embracing notion: 'The meaning of *Leben* as such, what its value is just for being *Leben*, this is what is enquired into, rather than this or that lived experience' ('Über einige gegenwärtige Probleme der Philosophie', in Simmel, 2000: 4).

With Nietzsche, *Leben* as a philosophical category becomes anthropomorphized and anthropocentric, a development that traces through to Dilthey's later hermeneutic philosophy and, arguably, to Heidegger's ontology of existence. 'From a quite different side did Bergson place the concept of *Leben* into the centre of a *Weltanschauung*', notes Simmel, and refers to the parallel yet distinct trajectory of vitalism. 'What in Nietzsche, in effect, only concerns human existence and its specific values, Bergson gives a cosmic turn: everything that does exist, with whatever ascertainable content, is a particular development of the *élan vital*' ('Über einige gegenwärtige Probleme der Philosophie', in Simmel, 2000: 5).

While Goethe has so far been considered as a *Lebensphilosoph avant le mot*, this somewhat over-harmonious relationship between his thinking and later developments of *Leben* needs to admit of some modification. One aspect that differentiates positions both within *Lebensphilosophie* and between it and Goethe concerns the important issue of the relationship of form and content, process and structure. Earlier, it was stressed that Goethe insisted on conjoining these moments of the totality of *Leben*. Later appropriations were less concerned to do so, frequently stressing the dynamic element over the forming, structuring one. This dynamic, striving moment, as was mentioned, has variously been depicted as *Kraft*,<sup>17</sup> will, will to power, *élan vital* – that is, as expressions of energies. Goethe, in addition, coined the term *Bildungstrieb* and used it to incorporate a structuring and forming moment into *Leben*-as-process. Left to their own devices, as pure dynamics, these drives or forces would lack internal directedness. As based on 'pure' dynamics, such philosophical elaborations of *Leben* could more readily be incorporated into any ideological movement that wishes to assert the primacy, and at times even the moral value, of dynamic, pro-active orientations towards life as such. The effective history of Nietzsche's 'will to power' (which, by the way, is to a large extent congruent with *Leben* in his work) or the *élan vital*, say in the case of Sorel, may provide some justification for this assertion. Goethe's *Leben*, in short, differs from some vitalist conceptions in that it unifies substance and form, process and structure. Its inhering moment of meaningful self-organization<sup>18</sup> and directional development through cycles of polarity relates it to Bergson's conception rather more than to Nietzsche's, and it is one Simmel seems to operate with also.

### Concluding Remarks: Towards the New *Weltanschauung*

Simmel's account of the epistemological and moral-aesthetic positions of Kant and Goethe amounts to the formulation of two contrasting *Weltanschauungen*, together with their differing metaphysical commitments. Counterpoised with a somewhat polemical intent, these are depicted as a mechanistic versus an organicist frame of reference. Within their terms, *Leben* is then either considered epistemologically as a residual category, or accorded ontological primacy.

In the latter case, within the *Leben* paradigm, our relations to the social and natural environment, and their conceptual reflections that have ossified into stultifying forms, are re-vitalized and returned to the eternal flow of *Dasein*. Simmel, as mentioned above, coined the apt term '*Verlebendigung*' for this process. It was hoped to herald the rise of a new epoch in which the 'Kantian' moment of life comes to be reabsorbed by the *Leben* that had given rise to it in the first place.

In these concluding remarks, it remains to address, at least in outline, the contemporary relevance of some of the insights that can be derived from 'Kant und Goethe' and some of Simmel's subsequent writings on this topic. But first, they should be complemented with a very brief consideration of one area in which Kant and Goethe await mediation, and one not addressed in any depth by Simmel: that of the status of Goethean science. We are offered an unmediated counter-position of Kant's 'scientific' and Goethe's 'aesthetic' approach to the study of nature. If left at this, they would inhabit completely different universes of discourse and cognitive realms. Such an interpretation would not square with Goethe's self-understanding as one engaged in scientific studies of nature that matched those of 'normal' science in terms of rigour and discipline, while surpassing them in insight. Towards the end of Simmel's essay on 'Kant und Goethe', we find the brief remark that Goethe's approach may objectively be the correct one, but one whose time had not yet come. Are we any nearer to it today?

It is here not the place to engage in the critical task of formulating Goethean science in the terms of contemporary discourses of science.<sup>19</sup> Yet, this task is an urgent one. Werner Heisenberg, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for physics, sounded a contemporary call 'back to Goethe', against the grain of the scientific optimism of the 1960s. 'The natural sciences and art have moved in a direction Goethe had warned against . . . natural science has taken the step into abstraction . . . and advanced towards the *Urgebilde* (primordial structures) in biology and the *Urformen* . . . At the same time, the dangers have become as threatening as Goethe anticipated. If we think of the increasing soullessness, of depersonalizing labour, the absurdity of modern weapons systems, or the flight into delusion that has taken the form of a political movement' (1967: 520). There are reverberations here of Simmel's account of the malaise of modernity. It is no accident that some of his tersest interpretations of social life appear in his book entitled *Goethe*: 'The increasing objectification of life', the instrumental rationality of the *Sachmensch* (expert, specialist, functionary), 'externally determined and directed . . .

being pulled by a goal rather than growing from the roots . . . regulated by norms that oppose *Leben*’, imbued with ‘professionalism’ (Simmel, 2003: 15–20). These and other indictments of our times echo Goethe almost verbatim, and mark Simmel’s, and by association Goethe’s, contemporaneity.

The social context for the rise of a Goethean-inspired era, of a *Verlebendigung*, seems no more propitious than it was a century ago. The social reality that had stifled the vitalistic impulse in Simmel’s time seems to have hardened up further. From within the hypermodern straightjacket of increasing instrumental rationality, an exploitative attitude towards our cultural resources and the social and natural environment, we cast a glance back at Simmel’s times – and find that conditions have, if anything, taken a turn for the worse. ‘Life’ is firmly on the moral-cultural, socio-political and scientific-technological agendas. At the same time, and already seemingly beyond their reach, the ‘life sciences’ are set to complete the Kantian utopia of finally subjugating organic processes to mathematical-experimental formulation. They are thereby bringing into view the dystopia of its technological utilization, driven, at least in part, by the codes of power and capital accumulation, bypassing moral-practical discourse.

Within the scientific community, voices are heard that bring these issues into the public arena. As a minimal agenda, there is Heisenberg’s call to supplement science with a Goethean ethos:

We can still learn today from Goethe that we must not let all our organs that have been given to us atrophy for the sake of just one, that of rational analysis. It is rather more the case that we should use all our organs to grasp reality and to rely on it that this reality will then also reflect what is essential; the One, God, the True. Let us hope that in the times ahead we will be better able to do this than in my generation (‘Das Naturbild Goethes und die technisch-naturwissenschaftliche Welt’, in Mandelkow (1979) Teil IV: 522).<sup>20</sup>

Goethean science as complementary to normal science? In the age of Heidegger’s *Gestell*, the scientific-technological enframing of our civilization, it would seem at first sight implausible that Goethean science could, even if ‘objectively correct’, form a viable alternative. Could it then, at least, form the ‘other’ pulse beat of *Leben* and further the *Verlebendigung* of scientific and socio-political practice that Heisenberg appears to be calling for? The litmus test as to if and when we are ready to embrace Goethe is provided by our relationship with nature. Concomitant with a mediation of Kant and Goethe, normal science and Goethean science, an overarching mediation will have had to take effect, that of nature and humanity, expressed incisively by Marx as the inter-relation of the humanization of nature and the naturalization of humanity. This programme would approximate the *Verlebendigung* Simmel associated with the project of *Lebensphilosophie*, and with the ethos of Goethe’s life and work.

In this article, Simmel’s evolving *Lebensphilosophie* has been construed as crucially deriving from his interpretation of Goethe’s work and life, the successful integration of which Simmel also once termed Goethe’s



most accomplished work. It provides us with insights gained from of a deep reverence for *Leben*: the alpha and omega of Goethe's *Welt-* and *Lebensanschauung*. In this simple point rests his signal importance for Simmel: as an exemplar and a challenge for the re-orientation of individuals as well as a whole civilization. To really understand Goethe is to live life fully and responsibly. To learn to live it well is to engage in dialogue with Nature; and through it aim to approach the mystery at the core of *Leben*. Life, in the Goethean sense, is always more-than-life, or as Simmel put it, 'transcendence is immanent to *Leben*' ('*Lebensanschauung I: Die Transzendenz des Lebens*', in Simmel, 2000: 3). Once engaged on the project of *Verlebendigung*, Goethe can serve as a resource and a mirror. As Simmel notes at the beginning of 'Goethe': '[T]he interpretation of Goethe as a whole . . . whether admitted or not, will always also be a self-confession of the interpreter' (Simmel, 2003: 2). In his recurrent and profound grappling with the challenge posed by Goethe, Simmel reveals the quest that took him from Kant towards Goethe: to help establish the philosophy of *Leben* as the new *Weltanschauung*.

#### Notes

1. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804); Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1748–1832); Georg Simmel (1858–1918). *Leben* translates simply as 'life'. In a philosophical context it has acquired a specific set of meanings, and the German term has for this reason been retained in English, and other language, discourse on this topic. In order to offer a working definition of *Leben*, it may be appropriate to avail ourselves of an account Simmel provides in his discussion of Friedrich Nietzsche, given that he regards the latter as one of the originators of *Lebensphilosophie*:

*Leben*, in its most principled sense, emerges here as the immeasurable sum of forces or potentialities that are themselves directed at augmentation, at intensification, at the increase in effectiveness of the process of Life. To describe the latter analytically is however not possible since, in its unicity, it constitutes the ultimate graspable core phenomenon concerning ourselves. ('Schopenhauer und Nietzsche', in Simmel, 1995b: 180)

Born just 12 years after Goethe's death, Nietzsche provides a hermeneutic bridge between Goethe and Simmel. Here is already present the same admiration of Goethe: the unmatched receptivity and productivity which defines his *Lebendigkeit* ('being imbued with Life'); the enhancement and intensification of every instance of *Erlebnis* ('lived experience'). For Nietzsche's debt to Goethe, see also Safranski (2006). Simmel also highlights *Steigerung* ('augmentation, enhancement, intensification, raising') as the key notion within the concept of *Leben*. This notion already served Goethe to elucidate the 'Lebensprinzip which contains the potentiality to increase in a manifold way the most simple origins of an appearing object through *Steigerung*, leading into infinity and the most dissimilar outcomes' (Goethe, in 'Anmerkungen der Herausgeber', HA 13: 559). Readers may also wish to consult Bleicher's (2006: 343–5) entry on *Leben*.

2. A consideration of the temporal sequence of events that followed the publication of 'Kant und Goethe' and led to his substantial monograph 'Goethe' highlights

the centrality of Goethe for Simmel's life and work in this period. In December 1911, he orders all of the 40 volumes of Goethe's works in the *Cottasche Jubilaeum-sausgabe* – that is, *after* he had already published on Goethe for over 10 years. In March 1912, he writes that 'I withdrew to Weimar (!) in order to reflect, in conditions free from any disturbance, on some very difficult, *and for me decisive*, problems (my emphasis). On 7 December, Marianne Weber, to whom 'Goethe' was dedicated, thanks Simmel upon receipt of a copy and notes that '... over and above all the details, it brings the wholeness and centrality of Goethe's spirit closer to the German people'. The book was finally published in May 1913. See the 'Editorischer Bericht' to the version of 'Kant und Goethe' published in the Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe (Simmel, 1995a, vol. 10: 520–1).

3. See the 'Editorischer Bericht' to the version of 'Kant und Goethe' published in the Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe (Simmel, 1995a, vol. 10: 415–8).

4. This school's focus is on the concept of 'value' (*Wert*) in respect of the methodology of the human sciences as opposed to natural science. This concept continues to figure centrally in Simmel's subsequent writings.

5. Were Simmel not so reluctant to use Hegelian–Marxist terminology, then *Leben* could quite readily be depicted as the totality that dialectically reconciles the contradictory moments that 'Kant' and 'Goethe' represent.

6. It is arguably the case that Nietzsche's admiration for Goethe underlies one of his more controversial formulations, that of *Übermensch* ('the person who has raised him/herself above and beyond the present state of humankind'). Interpreted from the direction of Goethe's notion of *Leben and Lebendigkeit*, in which it seems to have its roots, it may lose some of the problematic, sinister 'superman' connotations it has been attributed with. As Simmel states concerning the *Steigerung* (see Note 1) involved here, this notion expresses 'that *Leben* contains its own value within itself, that is to say, in the continual process whereby every stage reached is surmounted by a more complete and developed one' ('Schopenhauer und Nietzsche', in Simmel, 1995b: 181).

7. This did not preclude a fruitful and prolonged contact with Schelling and his 'Naturphilosophie', especially after publication of *Die Weltseele* that led to Goethe to support his appointment at Jena University.

8. In the course of the *Critique of Judgement*, Kant allows us glimpses into the high regard he had for the forming and educative capacity of Nature, which resonate with the deep convictions of Goethe. Given the background of both in Pietism and its reverence for Nature as God's work, this may help also to account for Goethe being drawn to Kant despite his aversion to purely abstract ruminations and the disregard for the constitutive role of Nature that Kant was led into on the philosophical level.

9. Goethe refers to Spinoza in his autobiographical *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Book 16, pp. 18–22. See also 'Studie nach Spinoza', in *Zur Naturwissenschaft im Allgemeinen* (HA 13: 7–9).

10. If one follows Simmel in this interpretation, some correction to the prevalent understanding of vitalism as well as *Lebensphilosophie* and their shared source in Spinoza may be required.

11. It remains here to point ahead to the way Goethe's thinking will develop this theme, not least in his theory of evolution: 'I venture to assert that once an organic

entity appears, the unicity and openness of the *Bildungstrieb* cannot be grasped without the concept of metamorphosis' ('*Bildungstrieb*', HA 13: 34).

12. See Prop. XI of Spinoza's *The Ethics, Part I* (Spinoza, 1960: 135).

13. The original reads: 'Dass dein Leben Gestalt, dein Gedanke Leben gewinne/Lass die belebende Kraft stets auch die bildende sein'.

14. Another formulation, one that anticipates Heidegger's fundamental ontology, arises from Simmel's discussion of Spinoza. *Das Sein* is that authentic reality that underlies any opposition between subject and object: 'denn das Sein ist allem Seinendem gemeinsam' (because Being is common to all beings). Quoted in Simmel (1927), p. 7.

15. Goethe refers to this correspondence as 'analogy', a move that characterizes the late phase of his scientific and poetic work. We may today prefer the term 'homology' to describe the communion between literary texts and Nature as text.

16. For detailed discussions, Simmel refers the reader to his work 'Schopenhauer und Nietzsche' (Simmel, 1995b).

17. *Kraft* is also used frequently by Goethe. Its conceptual history reaches, via Herder and Lessing, back to Plato's 'dynamis', as 'faculty of the soul'. Herder transposed it on to historical reality, and appears to have influenced Goethe's usage of *Kraft* as function of *Leben*. Hegel, too, leads from *Kraft* to *Leben*, and Simmel combines the two in the coinage *Lebenskraft*.

18. This aspect of *Leben* has significant implications and repercussions regarding a Goethean theory of evolution, and in itself renders it questionable whether Goethe can be construed as a direct precursor of Darwin, as Haeckel maintained among others.

19. Bortoft (1996) provides a lucid and influential exposition of Goethean science from within 'normal science'.

20. See also: 'Die Goethesche und Newtonsche Farbenlehre im Lichte der modernen Physik' (originally published in 'Geist der Zeit', 1941) in *Wandlungen in den Grundlagen der Naturwissenschaft*, 11th edition, 1980. Here, in Mandelkow (1979 IV: 233–45).

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